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The South Caucasus and Iran in the 
Post-Sanctions Era 
Pursuing Greater Interconnectedness amidst Continuing Constraints and 
Scaled-down Expectations 
Andrea Weiss and Yana Zabanova 
The lifting of international nuclear-related sanctions on Iran in January 2016 was en-
thusiastically welcomed by the Islamic Republic’s neighbours in the South Caucasus. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have hoped that Iran’s rapprochement with the West 
and the unfreezing of some hundred billion dollars worth of assets abroad would lead 
Iran to step up its trade and investment activities in the Caucasus, especially in the 
energy and transport sectors. However, the anticipated benefits have been slow in com-
ing, as Iran has shown reluctance to fund infrastructural projects in the Caucasus. On 
the other hand, there have been positive developments in trade and tourism flows 
and the power transmission sector. On the whole, although Iran is interested in closer 
economic cooperation with the South Caucasus, it relies on the region’s countries to 
provide the momentum and secure the resources necessary to achieve this goal. 
 
The lifting of the sanctions on Iran on 16 
January 2016 gave rise to varied expecta-
tions in the South Caucasus. As congratu-
latory messages flowed to Tehran from the 
region’s capitals, pundits and observers 
debated what Iran’s emergence from inter-
national isolation and its comeback to the 
global economy implied for the South Cau-
casus. According to one widespread view, 
with Iran and Europe growing closer to-
gether, the South Caucasus could use its 
geographic position to transform itself into 
a transit corridor for flows of goods and 
energy resources between the two. In the 
past 1.5 years, the region has witnessed a 
proliferation of meetings at the ministerial 
and presidential levels, accompanied by 
the signing of numerous memorandums of 
understanding in key sectors. In a symbolic 
gesture, in 2016 Georgia and Armenia lifted 
the visa requirement for Iranian citizens.  
In official statements, Iran and the South 
Caucasus countries often emphasise their 
historical and cultural ties and friendly 
relations. The territories of Armenia, east-
ern Georgia, and most of Azerbaijan were 
under Persian rule until the 19th century. 
Iran is home to the world’s largest popu-
lation of ethnic Azeris, numbering up to 25 
million, as well as smaller populations of 
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ethnic Georgians (up to 100,000) and Arme-
nians (ca. 65,000). It was quick to recognise 
the three newly independent republics in 
1991 and has been able to maintain a work-
ing relationship with each of them. Iran’s 
policy in the South Caucasus has been prag-
matic and stability-oriented, in sharp con-
trast to its ideology-driven policy in the 
Middle East. 
Despite the media attention generated 
by ambitious cooperation plans, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that Iran does not have 
significant economic clout in the South 
Caucasus. If the lifting of the sanctions is 
meant to be a game changer, it will have 
to start from a very low base. Iran’s trade 
turnover with the entire region was only 
$634 million in 2015, placing it far behind 
top trading partners such as Russia, the EU, 
China, or Turkey. Its official foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Georgia and Armenia is 
minuscule, although it has been more sub-
stantial in Azerbaijan (mainly in the oil 
sector). The Caucasus countries’ aspirations 
to become a transit corridor between Iran 
and Europe would require enormous invest-
ments and a major shift in trading pat-
terns. Presently, Iran’s overland trade with 
Europe takes place through Turkey, there is 
no direct rail link between Iran and either 
Armenia or Azerbaijan, and road connec-
tions are poor. Due to US policies, Iran has 
been excluded from major Western-sup-
ported pipeline projects in the region, which 
means that there is currently no infrastruc-
ture in the Caucasus to bring Iranian energy 
resources to European markets. Moreover, 
Iran is concerned about the uncertain 
future of the nuclear agreement under the 
Trump Administration and, under the pres-
sure of expectations at home, has chosen to 
prioritise domestic infrastructural develop-
ment. As a result, incremental changes in 
Iran’s economic cooperation with the South 
Caucasus constitute a more likely scenario. 
Armenia: 
Iran’s complementary neighbour 
Iran’s relations with Armenia – its closest 
partner and ally in the South Caucasus – 
remained largely unaffected by the in-
creasingly stringent international sanc-
tions, which were progressively introduced 
from 2006 onward. Armenia refrained from 
criticising Iran’s nuclear programme, using 
regular mutual high-level visits as occasions 
to push for the expansion of bilateral ties. 
Landlocked Armenia is under blockade 
from two of its four neighbours, Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, and relies on Georgia and Iran, 
with which it shares a 219 km and 44 km 
border respectively, for the transit of goods 
and energy. The road link to Iran became 
a lifeline for Armenia in the early 1990s 
during the conflict with Azerbaijan, as well 
as briefly in 2008 during the armed hostil-
ities between Georgia and Russia. A close 
relationship with Iran is meant not only 
to counterbalance the strong Turkish-Azer-
baijani cooperation in the region (which 
often involves Georgia as a partner) but also 
sends a message to the domestic audience 
that Armenia is not solely dependent on 
Russia. 
As for Iran, strong ties with Armenia are 
important both for promoting stability in 
its Caucasus neighbourhood and to show-
case Iran’s ability to act as a responsible 
regional player. Directly bordering the un-
recognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 
Iran has sought peaceful settlement of the 
conflict, negotiating a short-lived ceasefire 
in 1992 and repeatedly offering mediation 
services. Finally, Armenia could become 
Iran’s gateway to Georgia’s Black Sea ports, 
and from there to southern Europe. This 
would provide Iran with an alternative to 
its main transport route through Turkey, 
which has been fraught with many prob-
lems, including a major dispute over transit 
fees, long queues at the border, and attacks 
on Iranian truck drivers. 
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Ambitions on hold 
Both Armenia and Iran acknowledge the 
mismatch between their close political 
partnership and the limited scope of eco-
nomic cooperation. Indeed, bilateral trade 
turnover has hovered around a modest 
$300 million level, as Armenian producers 
find it difficult to access Iranian markets, 
which are protected by some of the world’s 
highest import duties, whereas Iranian 
consumer goods in Armenia face stiff com-
petition from the more affordable Turkish 
or Chinese alternatives. Tourism is a prom-
ising sector though, with Armenia being 
the region’s most popular destination for 
Iranian visitors. The US Embassy in Yerevan 
is also one of the most accessible locations 
for Iranians to apply for a US visa. 
Both Armenia and Iran stress the im-
portance of energy cooperation, although 
so far it has mostly been limited to the “gas 
for electricity” arrangement. The 140 km 
pipeline, which was officially inaugurated 
in 2007, delivers gas from Tabriz, Iran to 
Armenia, where most of it is then converted 
to electricity and transmitted to Iranian 
northern provinces. Contrary to Iran’s 
initial plans, the pipeline cannot be used 
for major exports beyond Armenia, as its 
diameter was reduced under Russia’s pres-
sure. Today, the entire gas distribution 
network in Armenia is controlled by Gaz-
prom Armenia, a full subsidiary of the Rus-
sian state-owned gas monopoly. 
Armenia has long wanted to vastly 
expand the scope of its cooperation with 
Iran. While still under the sanctions, the 
latter faced a challenging situation: given 
its forced isolation, Armenian initiatives 
were attractive, yet the burden of the sanc-
tions made financial commitments diffi-
cult. As a result, there has been a glaring 
disparity between the number of agree-
ments and memorandums of understand-
ing signed in the last decade – often to 
great media fanfare – and the little to no 
progress made on the ground. This applies 
to such big-ticket infrastructural projects 
as hydropower plants near Meghri on both 
sides of the Araxes River (2007), the $3.2 bil-
lion Southern Armenian Railway connect-
ing to the border with Iran (2009), an Iran-
Armenia oil pipeline (2011), and an oil re-
finery near Meghri to process Iranian crude. 
Post-sanctions prospects 
When the sanctions on Iran were lifted 
in January 2016, Armenia’s expectations 
focused largely on the fate of the joint 
projects awaiting implementation. Accord-
ing to one optimistic take, with its un-
frozen assets and an ability to export oil to 
Europe, Iran would be finally able to follow 
up on its investment promises in Armenia. 
A more sceptical view has cautioned that a 
de-isolated Iran could opt for economically 
more attractive partners. 
The sceptics seem to have a point. The 
most prominent project announced already 
in 2008 – the 305 km Southern Armenian 
Railway – has failed to secure external fund-
ing. Russia, which controls the Armenian rail 
network, has limited interest in the project, 
as it would not connect Iran to Russia (this 
could only happen if Georgia agreed to 
allow rail transport through Abkhazia). The 
railway has thus essentially lost competi-
tion to a rival Azerbaijani-Iranian initiative 
that has gained speed since 2016. However, 
Armenia is also implementing a major 
highway construction programme called 
the North-South Road Corridor, which is 
financed by international donors and is 
expected to nearly halve transit times and 
significantly improve road connections, 
both to Iran and Georgia. Although Iran 
stands to benefit from the project, it is not 
involved in its funding. 
Having heavily invested in its domestic 
power-generation capacity in recent years, 
Iran seems to have lost interest in the 
Meghri Hydro Power Plant project, which 
already had to be scaled down in 2014 for 
technical reasons. Also, now that Iran has 
access to European know-how, projects such 
as having an oil refinery built in Armenia 
appear to be losing their rationale. 
The only project that has truly gained 
momentum since the nuclear agreement is 
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the third high-voltage power transmission 
line between Armenia and Iran. In August 
2015, Armenia and Iran signed the contract 
for its construction, with Iran’s Export De-
velopment Bank covering 77 percent of the 
investment costs. The line is expected to 
more than triple the electricity exchange 
capacity between Armenia and Iran, which 
have different seasonal peaks, creating pre-
conditions for increasing Iran’s gas exports 
to Armenia as part of the “gas for electrici-
ty” deal. It will also connect to the grids of 
Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey, re-
flecting Iran’s ambitions to increase elec-
tricity exports to this region. 
According to some Armenian econo-
mists, the emphasis in Armenian-Iranian 
relations should move away from a preoccu-
pation with infrastructure towards a more 
skills-oriented approach. One popular pro-
posal is for the country to capitalise on its 
liberal business climate and a developed IT 
industry and to position itself as a business 
hub for European companies wishing to do 
business with Iran. For now, however, Euro-
pean companies’ interest in Iran remains 
thwarted by Western banks’ reluctance to 
fund such efforts for fear of US sanctions. 
Banking is an area of cooperation that 
received a special mention during President 
Hassan Rouhani’s official visit to Yerevan 
in December 2016. In the past, Iran was sus-
pected of using Armenian banks to evade 
sanctions, although allegations were never 
substantiated. The Armenian branch of 
Iran’s Mellat Bank, which mainly serves Ira-
nian customers, has received an investment 
boost following the lifting of the sanctions. 
The tourism sector is also continuing to 
develop. Armenia hosted 189,000 Iranian 
tourists in 2016, a record number. The bilat-
eral visa-free agreement that entered into 
force in August 2016 is helpful, although 
Iranians had already been able to obtain 
Armenian visas on arrival for a small fee. 
Although Armenia might face stronger com-
petition from Georgia now that the latter 
has dropped the visa requirement for Ira-
nians, both might gain from Turkey’s di-
minishing appeal. 
Finally, as the only member of the Eura-
sian Economic Union (EEU) that directly 
borders Iran, Armenia has been actively 
pushing for a free trade agreement between 
the EEU and the Islamic Republic. Better 
terms of trade between the two would in-
crease Armenia’s importance as a transit 
country and give it better access to Iranian 
markets – something that Armenia had 
unsuccessfully been trying to negotiate for 
years. Iran is interested in stronger links 
with the EEU but is treading cautiously, as 
it has no experience with free trade agree-
ments. In the meantime, Armenia and Iran 
are planning to set up a free trade zone 
near Meghri and signed a customs coopera-
tion agreement in April 2017. 
Azerbaijan: 
Iran’s ambivalent neighbour 
Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan have been 
the most tension-ridden of all countries in 
the South Caucasus, leading many observers 
to expect Baku to be negatively impacted by 
Iran’s de-isolation. Azerbaijan has criticised 
Iran’s close ties with Armenia and accused 
Iran of trying to influence Azerbaijan’s Shia 
religious activists and the Talysh, an Ira-
nian ethnic group in the south. In turn, 
Iran has been apprehensive about Azerbai-
jan’s thriving military and security coopera-
tion with Israel and its perceived attempts 
to stir discontent among Iran’s large ethnic 
Azeri population. The two countries have 
also disagreed about the way to delimit 
the Caspian Sea with its valuable energy 
resources. Unlike Armenia or Georgia, Azer-
baijan has kept its unilateral visa require-
ment for Iranians. 
On the other hand, Azerbaijan, whose oil 
production has been in decline since 2009, 
is also seeking to develop its non-oil sector 
and become a regional transport hub. Co-
operation with Iran is important to these 
plans, and it has the added benefit of 
undermining similar initiatives by Arme-
nia. Iranian-Azerbaijani relations began 
to improve in 2013, after Rouhani became 
president in Iran. Since then, President 
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Ilham Aliyev and President Rouhani have 
met eight times. 
So far, trade between Iran and Azer-
baijan has been limited in scope, with the 
turnover standing at $229 million in 2015, 
although it reportedly grew by 70 percent 
in 2016. Iran’s National Oil Company holds 
a 10 percent stake in the development of 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 2 gas field, and the 
two countries have had a small-scale gas-
swap deal in place since 2005: Azerbaijan 
pumps gas to Iran’s northern provinces 
through Astara, and Iran in exchange sup-
plies Azerbaijan’s exclave, Nakhchivan. 
For Azerbaijanis, especially those living in 
border regions, Iran is an affordable visa-
free destination for shopping and medical 
tourism. 
Transport sector 
Since the conclusion of the nuclear agree-
ment in 2015, Azerbaijan has greatly in-
tensified its efforts in pursuing a direct rail 
link with Iran, which the two countries 
agreed to construct in 2010. It is currently 
the main missing element in a grand vision 
for a 7,200 km North-South Transport Cor-
ridor connecting Iran’s Persian Gulf port 
of Bandar Abbas with northern Europe 
through Azerbaijan and Russia, and pro-
viding an alternative to the lengthy mari-
time route through the Suez Canal and the 
Mediterranean. The projected 375 km Iran-
Azerbaijan railway, which is less expensive 
and technically challenging than Armenia’s 
rival project, would run from Qazvin – a 
regional capital in northern Iran – to Rasht 
and then to Iranian Astara at the border 
with Azerbaijan. From there, it would con-
nect to Azerbaijani Astara through a bridge 
and an 8 km section. Most construction 
would take place on Iranian territory, which 
fits in with Iran’s strategy to develop its 
domestic rail network. The railway has 
been at the top of the agenda of all recent 
official meetings between Iran and Azer-
baijan, most prominently during the 
August 2016 trilateral presidential summit 
of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Russia in Baku. 
With the Qazvin-Rasht section to become 
operational in 2017 and the Astara-Astara 
link completed, the crucial element is the 
175 km Rasht-Astara section, which would 
cost ca. $1 billion and take some five years 
to construct. Azerbaijan has offered Iran 
a $500 million loan to help finance the 
project, but Iran has been slow in securing 
the remaining funding (which may also 
include Russian investment). Nevertheless, 
according to Iranian officials, construction 
is supposed to begin in 2017. 
While cooperating with Azerbaijan on the 
North-South Corridor, Iran is increasingly 
competing against it in the Caspian, where it 
is trying to gain control over a greater share 
of shipping traffic currently dominated 
by Azerbaijan. Reflecting Iran’s growing 
cooperation with Russia and its interest in 
developing trade with Central Asia, Iran 
launched a new Caspian shipping line in 
June 2015, and Iranian companies purchased 
majority stakes in Russia’s ports of Makhach-
kala and Astrakhan in January 2017. 
Iran and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline 
Since the lifting of the sanctions, much 
discussion has focused on the prospects of 
Iran’s potential gas exports to Europe. Iran 
has the world’s second-largest gas reserves 
but consumes almost 90 percent of its gas 
domestically. However, with its newly re-
gained access to funding and Western tech-
nologies, Iran is intent on increasing its 
production volumes and becoming a major 
exporter. Azerbaijan has been interested in 
Iran’s participation in its flagship project, 
the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 
which is supposed to connect to the planned 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline to deliver gas to 
southern Europe. TANAP will initially carry 
only Azerbaijani gas, but its capacity will be 
significantly expanded in the future, allow-
ing for the transit of gas from other sup-
pliers such as Iran. The EU, which is seeking 
to diversify its supplies away from Russia, 
has welcomed this option. 
Iran first expressed its interest in TANAP 
in 2014, but its participation in the project 
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is far from certain, especially amidst per-
sistently low gas prices. One obstacle is the 
lack of suitable infrastructure for transport-
ing large amounts of gas from Iran’s rich 
fields in the south to the north. It would be 
feasible to connect the Tabriz-Ankara pipe-
line used by Iran for its exports to Turkey 
to TANAP, but this pipeline has faced 
serious security challenges, and its limited 
capacity would prevent Iran from exporting 
much. For now, Iran’s strategy seems to be 
to concentrate on developing its liquefied 
natural gas facilities for exports to Asian 
markets, with plans to expand to Europe 
later on. 
Georgia: Iran’s potential “gateway” 
to the West 
Georgia is the most removed from Iran 
among the South Caucasus countries, 
not only due to the absence of a common 
border, but also due to its pronounced 
Western orientation. On the other hand, 
Georgia’s proximity to the West – and, in 
particular, the EU – has also served as a 
factor of attraction for Iran and Iranians. 
Generally, unlike Armenia or Azerbaijan, 
Georgia has lacked a consistent strategy 
on how to engage with Iran, at times intro-
ducing abrupt policy changes. 
Georgian-Iranian economic ties began 
developing after the 2003 Rose Revolution, 
with the Mikheil Saakashvili government 
viewing Iran as a useful (although not top 
priority) regional partner, especially as rela-
tions with Russia soured. When the latter 
stopped gas deliveries to Georgia in the 
winter of 2006, it was Iran that filled the 
gap. Trade turnover between Georgia and 
Iran rose from $10.4 million in 2003 to 
$176.8 million in 2013; in 2016, it stood 
at $131 million. Currently, the main Geor-
gian export good with relative potential 
for growth is live sheep, whereas Georgia 
imports construction materials such as 
bitumen from Iran. Given its structure and 
low volumes, trade with Iran is unlikely to 
become a major driver of economic growth 
in the near future. 
With its liberal business climate, lax resi-
dency requirements, and geographic close-
ness, Georgia attracted many Iranian com-
panies during the sanctions period, especial-
ly in the agriculture, food, and construction 
industries. In official data, Iranian FDI has 
never exceeded $1.8 million, although 
these figures do not account for invest-
ments coming from expatriate Iranians. 
When Georgia lifted visa requirements in 
January 2011, many Iranians relocated to 
Tbilisi, registering companies in the Poti 
Free Zone on the Black Sea. Some were 
fleeing Iran’s economic woes, whereas 
others flocked in from Dubai – a popular 
destination for evading sanctions that was 
now tightening its regulations. In 2011–
2012, three Iranian businessmen from Dubai 
(later placed on the US sanctions list) estab-
lished a private airline and gained control 
of JSC InvestBank. Soon, Iran’s business 
activities attracted media attention, with a 
2013 Wall Street Journal article reporting that 
more than 150 front groups linked to Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards were active in the 
country. 
Under mounting US pressure, in July 
2013 Georgia froze Iranian citizens’ and 
businesses’ bank accounts with no prior 
notice, suspended the visa-free regime, and 
unilaterally cancelled some earlier agree-
ments and contracts. The restrictions were 
applied rather indiscriminately and affected 
many legitimate businesses, dealing a seri-
ous blow to Iranian investors’ confidence 
in Georgia. Small and medium-sized enter-
prises were hit especially hard, whereas 
some larger businesses adapted by setting 
up front companies under Georgians’ 
names through proxies. With Georgian 
banks fearful of US sanctions, some of the 
restrictions remain in place, making it com-
plicated for Iranian citizens to open a bank 
account in Georgia, and especially to re-
ceive bank transfers from Iran. This con-
tinues to be a serious limitation on the 
development of business ties between the 
two countries. 




Georgia has promoted its Black Sea ports as 
part of the transport corridor connecting 
Iran to Europe, but this ultimately depends 
on the success of Iran’s transport coopera-
tion with Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the 
energy sector, in early 2016, Georgia – faced 
with growing domestic demand for gas – 
expressed interest in purchasing gas from 
Iran via Armenia. Azerbaijan, which sup-
plies 90 percent of Georgia’s gas, reacted 
by offering a large increase in exports and 
reducing the price. In July 2016, Iran’s 
National Gas Company signed a memoran-
dum of understanding with a private Geor-
gian company on test deliveries of 40 mil-
lion m³ of gas through Armenia over a four-
month period. Deliveries are reportedly 
expected to start soon, but there is still a 
lack of clarity regarding some technical 
aspects of such a transaction. Georgia is 
also a partner in Iran’s plans to create a 
large electricity-exchange market in the 
region. 
Although Georgian-Iranian economic 
relations have yet to fully recover from 
the damage inflicted by the restrictions im-
posed in 2013, the reintroduction of the 
visa-free regime in February 2016 was an 
important step forward. Iranian tourism 
to Georgia has experienced strong growth 
over the years, strongly reacting to the 
changes in the visa regime. The number 
of arrivals increased from 21,000 in 2010 
to 60,000 in 2011 and fell sharply in 2013, 
only to rebound to a record 148,000 in 
2016. These data include not only recrea-
tional visitors but also those involved in 
small-scale shuttle trade and those coming 
on multi-purpose visits. 
Georgia’s deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, 
which entered into force in 2014, can also 
potentially increase the country’s attrac-
tiveness for Iranian investors wishing to use 
it as a platform for tariff-free exports to the 
EU. Investors can assemble the entire prod-
uct in Georgia, taking advantage of com-
petitive labour costs. Alternatively, they can 
move only the final stage of the production 
process, as long as they meet the minimum 
requirements on rules of origin, as stipu-
lated in the DCFTA. 
Conclusions 
Contrary to initial expectations in the South 
Caucasus, the lifting of the sanctions on 
Iran has not yet produced major benefits for 
the region. The region’s small-sized econo-
mies in themselves hold limited attraction 
for the Islamic Republic unless they can 
function as a gateway to larger markets 
such as Russia or the EU. If successfully 
completed, large infrastructural projects 
such as the Iran-Azerbaijan railway or the 
Iran-Caucasus power market could increase 
the region’s economic significance for Iran. 
Until now, however, with the exception 
of the power transmission sector, Iran has 
been cautious about making major finan-
cial commitments due to its emphasis on 
domestic infrastructural development and 
its interest in emerging opportunities in 
other regions, such as Central and South 
Asia. In the case of Armenia, the removal 
of the sanctions has also eliminated the 
rationale for some of the earlier coopera-
tion plans with Iran. It would be wrong 
to say that Iran’s de-isolation has had no 
positive impact on the Caucasus. On the 
whole, however, many constraints remain 
in place, as both Iran and the South Cau-
casus continue to prioritise relations with 
other partners. 
Recommendations for a multi-faceted 
EU engagement 
Although the EU and Iran have no experi-
ence of cooperation in the South Caucasus, 
both are interested in the region’s stability 
and economic development and, unlike 
in the Middle East, are not stymied by ideo-
logical divisions. As the EU and Iran are 
still in the early stages of institutionalising 
their relationship – including working 
towards establishing the EU’s first-ever 
delegation to Iran – they understandably 
have many higher-priority issues on their 
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agenda. In the medium term, however, the 
South Caucasus could become a promising 
area for EU-Iranian cooperation, with Iran 
eager to be recognised as a responsible 
regional actor. The South Caucasus nations, 
which have stressed their region’s role as a 
bridge between Iran and Europe, are likely 
to welcome such cooperation as well. 
In the revised version (2015) of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, the EU em-
phasises the need for broader formats of 
cooperation involving both EU partners and 
third countries where this is required by 
connections and interdependencies. For the 
South Caucasus and Iran, relevant issues 
may include energy, transport, customs, 
environment, education, and societal ties – 
all areas where the EU is well-placed to play 
the role of a mediator, a source of expertise, 
or a donor. Promoting regional cooperation 
is one of the main strands of work of the 
Iran Task Force – a special unit within the 
EU External Action Service that monitors 
the implementation of the nuclear agree-
ment. The South Caucasus, Iran, and the EU 
all stand to benefit from closer economic 
ties, greater mobility, and enhanced engage-
ment and dialogue on various scales. This 
type of cooperation would not only be valu-
able as a confidence-building measure, but 
it would also reflect the EU’s identity as a 
global actor advancing European values. 
There are a number of practical steps 
the EU could take, starting with building 
expertise on Iran’s relations with the South 
Caucasus. Whereas Iran has closely fol-
lowed EU activities in the South Caucasus, 
the EU has viewed the region primarily 
through the post-Soviet prism, with the 
result that both the Task Force and EU 
delegations to Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-
baijan lack a nuanced understanding of 
Iran’s role in the region. 
By stepping up its support for Iran’s 
membership bid in the World Trade Orga-
nization, the EU would help promote a 
more transparent business environment 
in Iran that would benefit Iran’s partners, 
both in the EU and the South Caucasus. 
The EU could also cooperate with Iran and 
Armenia on nuclear safety standards or 
facilitate Iran’s cooperation with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan on addressing environmen-
tal issues in border areas, such as water 
pollution in the Araxes basin. Another idea 
is to share the EU’s best practices on effi-
cient and citizen-friendly border manage-
ment that could be applied at Armenia’s 
and Azerbaijan’s border crossings with 
Iran. 
In addition, the EU could promote soci-
etal contacts by bringing together students, 
young professionals, and civil society rep-
resentatives from Iran and the South Cau-
casus to discuss issues of common interest, 
including under-researched phenomena 
such as small-scale cross-border trade. More 
generally, the EU could act as a facilitator 
and donor to projects aimed at developing 
the Iranian-Caucasus border areas and cross-
border ties by focusing on the impact of 
trade and transit on border communities. 
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